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#METOO AT 35,000 FEET: REDUCING THE RISK
OF IN-FLIGHT SEXUAL ASSAULTS
RYAN MUSSER*
ABSTRACT
According to the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI),
reports of minors and women sexually assaulted on flights have
risen dramatically in the last few years. It remains unclear
whether this is the result of more assaults or an increase in vic-
tims’ courage to report as inspired by the #MeToo movement.
In any case, America has been given notice of a truly horrifying
problem and a lack of any real hope for victims. This Comment
suggests that passenger safety can be improved by creating an
Offender No-Fly List for those who have been convicted of in-
flight sexual assaults.
A flight’s path through several state jurisdictions means that a
victim’s rights to criminal and civil remedies change depending
on the flight’s departure location, destination, and path
through the air. Additionally, although federal law criminalizes
in-flight assaults, prosecutors often charge offenders with lesser
state-law actions that provide offenders with the opportunity to
repeatedly offend. Thus, repeat offenders sometimes walk away
with seemingly few consequences.
Those seeking or enticed by crimes of opportunity will cer-
tainly find them in a flight’s unique environment. Falling asleep
in a dimly lit cabin only a few inches from a complete stranger
will always have inherent risk. However, society can make flights
safer by enforcing uniform federal penalties that will deter possi-
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ble offenders and prohibit convicted offenders from flying for a
predetermined time.
This Comment addresses various ways that the United States
has handled other threats to passenger safety and suggests a sim-
ilar, but tailored approach to deterring in-flight sexual assaults.
For example, the government’s use of the Terrorist No-Fly List,
though arguably effective, raises serious constitutional issues as
it seems to penalize innocent citizens in violation of procedural,
if not substantive, due process.
Unlike the Terrorist No-Fly List, the Offender No-Fly List’s
travel limitations are not subject to the same due process chal-
lenges. This solution punishes offenders, protects possible vic-
tims, and reduces recidivism by: (1) preventing offenders from
flying for a set time; (2) motivating offenders to seek treatment;
and (3) creating a unified database that enhances punishment
for repeat offenders.
The United States has an opportunity to respond to the cries
of these victims. It has the chance to recognize the complexity of
the problem and do more than study it. Right now, Congress
can make flights safer for everyone without violating the consti-
tutional rights of anyone by implementing the Offender No-Fly
List. Years from now, if sexual assaults repeatedly plague minors
and women on flights across this country, it will only be because
we failed to act now.
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I. INTRODUCTION
IN 1999, BETH1 boarded a flight from Detroit to Chicago.2While trying to sleep, she felt the man behind her touch her
breast three separate times.3 She reported the man, and he
pleaded guilty to “battery for knowingly making unlawful physi-
cal contact” in the Circuit Court of Cook County in Illinois. 4 In
2002, Caroline was flying from San Jose and, while laying down
to rest, was assaulted when the man in the seat behind her
grabbed her breast.5 As he reached forward to grab her breast,
Caroline “clamped down on his arm with her elbow,” but the
man decided this meant that she “wanted [it].” 6 The suspect
confessed to the FBI that he was “excited” and sexually aroused
at the time, and he eventually pleaded guilty in federal court to
“abusive sexual contact for knowingly engaging in sexual con-
tact with [Caroline] without her permission.”7
Likewise, in 2011, Susan boarded a Southwest flight after re-
turning from a trip to Las Vegas with her husband in celebra-
tion of their thirty-fourth wedding anniversary.8 Since Southwest
has open seating, she and her husband chose their seats.9 Su-
san’s husband is blind in his right eye, so he sat in the aisle seat
on her left so that he could see the flight attendants for in-flight
service.10 Susan, feeling ill, chose to sit in the window seat hop-
ing to lean against the window and get rest.11 A man, unknown
to the couple, sat between them.12 She went to sleep on the
flight and, on several different occasions, felt something press-
ing against her upper thigh.13 At one point in the flight, Susan
noticed that the man had turned his legs toward her, and think-
1 The names Caroline and Beth are not the real names of these victims. They
are used to preserve the anonymity found in the district court’s opinion and to
correspond to the court’s use of Victims C and B, respectively. See United States v.
Erramilli, No. 11 CR 0778, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49318, at *7–9 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 4,
2013) (mem. op.).
2 Id. at *8.
3 Id. at *8, *26.
4 Id. at *8.
5 Id. at *8, *26.
6 United States v. Erramilli, 788 F.3d 723, 727 (7th Cir. 2015).
7 Erramilli, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49318, at *8–9.






230 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [84
ing that was odd, she acted as if she had gone back to sleep.14
Upon opening her eyes, she found the man had “reached his
left hand across his body and, while concealing it with a newspa-
per, slid his hand up her shorts and squeezed her inner thigh.”15
Susan immediately began to fight back.16 Her husband had to
prevent the man from leaving the plane after landing, and the
police took the man into custody.17 The most tragic part of these
three stories is that they were all committed by the same man—
Srinivasa Erramilli.18
In the wake of the #MeToo movement, the FBI has seen a
66% increase from 2014 to 2017 in the number of midair sexual
assaults investigated.19 In 2017, 63 cases of sexual assault were
reported, and while that number may not seem massive, the
number of reported cases has been growing from “57 in 2016,
40 in 2015[,] and 38 in 2014.”20 The 2017 result is the highest
number of incidents ever reported, and the FBI remains confi-
dent that many cases are never reported.21 A recent flight at-
tendant survey conducted by the Association of Flight
Attendants found that of the 1,929 flight attendants responding,
one-in-five flight attendants “has experienced a report of passen-
ger on passenger sexual assault while working on a flight.”22
These numbers point to either a growing problem or a growing
awareness of an existing one.
II. ROADMAP
This Comment will discuss the nature of the problem as it
currently exists. Then it will analyze the state of the law and ar-
gue why it is currently insufficient to address the problem at




18 See id. at 727.
19 Javier De Diego et al., FBI: Sexual Assaults on Flights Increasing ‘At an Alarming
Rate,’ CNN (June 20, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/06/20/politics/fbi-air
plane-sexual-assault/index.html [https://perma.cc/ES8W-CF27] (last visited
Aug. 14, 2019).
20 Id.
21 Sexual Assault Aboard Aircraft: Raising Awareness About a Serious Federal Crime,
FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION (Apr. 26, 2018), https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/
raising-awareness-about-sexual-assault-aboard-aircraft-042618 [https://perma.cc/
A6PV-GJY6] (last visited Feb. 5, 2019).
22 #MeToo in the Air, ASS’N OF FLIGHT ATTENDANTS-CWA, https://
www.afacwa.org/metoo#a1 [https://perma.cc/CHj7-EZBK] (last visited Aug. 14,
2019).
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hand. Both tortious and criminal claims will be scrutinized, and
the inadequacies of both systems will be revealed. Having ex-
plained a need for deterrence and preventative measures, a
brief history of preventative measures in the airline industry will
be examined, and then an understanding of how the current
terrorist No-Fly List functions as a preventative measure will be
offered.
This Comment will next outline a proposed Offender No-Fly
List (ONFL). The argument for this list will take two forms.
First, having just explained the workings of the terrorist No-Fly
List, similarities and differences will be highlighted. Second,
common objections of substantive and procedural due process
violations will be examined and refuted based on the proposed
ONFL’s inherent strengths when compared to the terrorist No-
Fly List. After this, a brief conclusion will be offered.
III. THE STATE OF THE PROBLEM
Flying on an airplane poses risks uncommon to other areas of
our daily lives. The FBI notes that passengers may perceive the
cabin of the airplane as “a bubble of safety,” but “particularly on
overnight flights, where people may consume alcohol or take
sleeping pills, and a dark cabin and close-quarter seating can
give the perception of privacy and intimacy, offenders are
tempted by the opportunity.”23
Passengers flying alone are virtually assured of sitting next to a
stranger for the duration of the flight. They have no way of mak-
ing an informed decision about the person they will be sitting
next to, and even if they decided before takeoff that they would
prefer not to sit next to a person due to offensive behavior or
language, often flights are full, leaving the passenger with the
choice of abandoning his or her flight or enduring the ordeal.
Additionally, assaults sometimes take place during takeoff or
landing, when passengers are forbidden from leaving their seats,
making escape more problematic.24 As the area of passengers’
seats has continued to shrink, the problem is only
exacerbated.25
23 Sexual Assault Aboard Aircraft: Raising Awareness About a Serious Federal Crime,
supra note 21.
24 See United States v. Erramilli, 788 F.3d 723, 726 (7th Cir. 2015) (explaining
that Susan was assaulted the last time during descent when she could not freely
move around the plane and this made her particularly vulnerable).
25 Kari Paul, FAA Declines to Put a Stop to the ‘Incredible Shrinking Airline Seat,’
MARKETWATCH (July 9, 2018), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/faa-declines-
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While passengers can be reasonably certain the person next to
them will not be armed, potential offenders can also be reasona-
bly certain that potential victims—for instance, a young woman
who might have mace while jogging in the park—will also be
completely unarmed during the flight.
Finally, the flightcrew may dim the lights even on short flights,
giving opportunities for weary travelers to rest before arriving at
their destination. Few places other than flights involve strangers
sleeping in a dimly lit area only inches from complete strangers,
and many of the cases involving sexual assault involve women
asleep during flights, taken advantage of by other passengers—
sometimes even while spouses, friends, or other passengers sit
nearby.
Courts have found these characteristics of air travel to in-
crease the risk of sexual assault.26 The U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit held that the “characteristics of air travel,”
including cramped economy class seating, dim lighting, and
seating among unknown men, had increased a victim’s vulnera-
bility to an in-flight sexual assault.27
While every passenger has some risk in these situations, the
FBI notes that women and unaccompanied minors often suffer
these offenses.28 On June 15, 2016, an unaccompanied female
child flew on a domestic flight from Dallas, Texas, to Portland,
Oregon.29 She was assigned a window seat, and a man unknown
to her was assigned the middle seat next to her.30 The man ex-
hibited no peculiar actions during boarding or takeoff, other
than needing to be reminded to put away his personal items and
secure his tray table.31 Shortly after the in-flight service of
snacks, and despite instructions that flight attendants should
“pay extra attention to the [unaccompanied minors] and ‘en-
sure their well being and safe travel,’” a flight attendant discov-
ered the male passenger with his hand in the minor’s “groin” or
to-put-a-stop-to-the-incredible-shrinking-airline-seat-2018-07-09 [https://
perma.cc/YJ4Y-HUUU].
26 Wallace v. Korean Air, 214 F.3d 293, 299 (2d Cir. 2000).
27 Id.
28 Sexual Assault Aboard Aircraft: Raising Awareness About a Serious Federal Crime,
supra note 21.
29 R.M. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 338 F. Supp. 3d 1203, 1206 (D. Or. 2018).
30 Id.
31 Id. at 1206–07 (citations omitted).
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“crotch” area.32 According to the family, the child suffers a fear
of men and of flying to this day.33
These assaults are normally inflicted by strangers and occur
seemingly without warning. They may have lasting conse-
quences—restricting victims’ ability to travel by air.34 While pas-
sengers could not reasonably expect to know enough details
about the people around them to make informed decisions re-
garding their safety, they should be able to rely upon the law for
foreseeable remedies and preventative actions. Unfortunately,
that is often not the case.
IV. CURRENT LAW: UNKNOWN REMEDIES AND
TEPID PENALTIES
The current state of the law allows restricted tort remedies
and weak criminal prosecutions for victims of sexual assault. The
law has failed to address actual prevention or deterrence in
many of these cases.
Passengers that find themselves victims of sexual assault while
on flights have two main options: they can file criminal actions
against the offender, or they can file civil charges against both
the offender and the airline. Many passengers—victims and of-
fenders alike—are likely unaware of what criminal and tort laws
apply during their particular flight, and this becomes especially
true when addressing issues on international flights. Often pas-
sengers might not understand how the law characterizes flights
as either domestic or international and how this affects the pas-
sengers’ legal rights.
A. TORT RECOVERY: UNKNOWN REMEDIES
While many consider a chief aim of torts to be deterrence,35
deterrence requires foreseeability of consequences. Victims can
certainly sue the offenders in tort, but this would likely bring in
a small recovery and little deterrence. Passengers’ chances of re-
covery against the airline turn not merely on the facts but per-
haps even more so on what law will be applicable. These factors
are not foreseeable for passengers and change with every case.
32 Id.
33 Id. at 1207–08.
34 See id.
35 See Andrew F. Popper, In Defense of Deterrence, 75 ALB. L. REV. 181, 183
(2012).
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Given this unpredictability, how could this serve as a deterrent
for the airline or a source of comfort for the passenger?
Tort recovery drastically changes depending on whether the
flight is characterized as international or domestic. Rather, it is
the passenger that is actually characterized as international or do-
mestic.36 The international or domestic characterization of a
passenger depends on the individual passenger’s ticket.37 An in-
ternational passenger is one whose ticket “shows either (1) an
origin in one country and a destination in another country or
(2) an origin and destination in one country but a planned in-
termediate stop in a different country.”38 A domestic passenger,
in contrast, is one in which the passenger’s ticket lists an arrival
and departure within the same country and has no planned stops
in any other country.39 Making an unplanned stop in another
country would not change the passenger’s characterization.40 A
passenger on a direct flight from Dallas, Texas, to Anchorage,
Alaska, would be a domestic passenger even if she flew over Ca-
nada, since her flight never planned to stop in an area outside
of the United States.41
These characterizations are often not so simple. Different pas-
sengers may be international or domestic though physically
aboard the same plane.42 For instance, if Julie is flying from Dal-
las to London with a stop in New York City, then Julie is an inter-
national passenger.43 But Karen, on the same plane, is flying
from Dallas to New York City, and therefore is a domestic pas-
senger.44 If both women were assaulted on this same flight while
flying over Texas airspace, Karen’s tort recovery would be likely
be determined by the forum court’s choice of law rules45 while
Julie’s tort recovery would be largely, if not entirely, controlled
by the “Warsaw Convention as amended by the Montreal Agree-






42 Id. at 185.
43 See id.
44 See id. at 185–86.
45 See id. at 186; R.M. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 338 F. Supp. 3d 1203, 1210–13 (D.
Or. 2018) (finding that the Oregon choice of law rules apply since it was the
forum state, but that those rules require using Texas law—the airspace where the
assault occurred).
2019] IN-FLIGHT SEXUAL ASSAULTS 235
ment.”46 The recoveries possible for each woman could be dra-
matically different from both each other and from each
woman’s expectation.47
For domestic in-flight assault victims, the choice of law issues
may drastically change their recovery.48 In the case of the afore-
mentioned unaccompanied minor who was assaulted while fly-
ing from Dallas to Oregon, the victim’s family brought suit
against the airline.49 The case involved a dispute between the
parties over what law should apply. Under Oregon law, the air-
line had a duty “to protect against risk of foreseeable harms ‘in-
cluding the risk of harm from third-party criminal acts.’”50
However, under Texas law, the airline presumptively had no
duty to protect the victim from “criminal acts of third parties
unless the criminal act [was] foreseeable.”51 Oregon made fore-
seeability a question for the jury, while Texas made the question
of duty a matter of law.52 Given these differences, the burden of
surviving the airline’s motion for summary judgment would de-
pend heavily upon what law was chosen.
The court found that Oregon’s “statutory choice of law meth-
odology” should be applied, since the case was brought in a fed-
eral court in Oregon and federal courts “look to the forum
state’s choice of law rules to determine the controlling substan-
tive law.”53 Using this methodology, the court found that Texas’s
tort law should apply because the victim and the airline were
domiciled in different states, the injury occurred over Texas air-
space, the airline was domiciled in Texas, and the injury contin-
ued across many states, as the minor continued to suffer trauma
until the plane landed in Oregon.54 Under Texas law, a com-
mon carrier would only have a duty and could be liable where “a
criminal’s conduct is a foreseeable result of the prior negligence
of a party.”55 The court held that under Texas law, this assault
46 HAMILTON, supra note 36, at 186.
47 See id.
48 See R.M., 388 F. Supp. 3d at 1210–13.
49 Id. at 1208.
50 Id. at 1211 (quoting Piazza v. Kellim, 377 P.3d 492, 501 (Or. 2016)).
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Id. at 1210.
54 Id. at 1211–13.
55 Id. at 1213 (quoting Barton v. Whataburger, Inc., 276 S.W.3d 456, 462 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, pet. denied)).
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was not foreseeable and granted the defendant’s motion for
summary judgment.56
As this case shows, even where plaintiffs are domestic passen-
gers, their options for tort recovery might be limited by the ex-
act moment of the assault, the duration and geographic location
of their continued suffering as they speed through the air, and
the domicile of their airline of choice.57 Domestic passengers
cannot know when purchasing a ticket what set of laws will gov-
ern nor their chances of tort recovery should they be assaulted
on a flight.
International passengers are subject to treaties such as the
Warsaw Convention—an international treaty that more uni-
formly addresses tort recovery than the panoply of domestic
choice of law rules but also limits passengers’ recovery in ways
many likely do not understand.58 A complete review of the full
scope of the Warsaw and Montreal Conventions is beyond the
scope of this Comment. This Comment will only address a brief
summary of issues necessary to understand the applicability to
international passengers who are also victims of in-flight sexual
assault.59
The Warsaw Convention “had two goals: to establish uniform
rules for international air travel and to limit potential carrier
liability for passenger injuries so as not to frighten away poten-
tial investors from the fledgling air industry.”60 The 1999 Mon-
treal Convention was an attempt to update the then seventy-
year-old Warsaw Convention.61
Courts have found case law surrounding the Warsaw Conven-
tion has “at least some persuasive value in interpreting parallel
56 Id. at 1215, 1217.
57 Id. at 1211–13.
58 Jennifer McKay, The Refinement of the Warsaw System: Why the 1999 Montreal
Convention Represents the Best Hope for Uniformity, 34 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 73, 99
(2002).
59 For a detailed discussion regarding sexual assault and assault claims under
the Warsaw Convention, see generally Judith R. Karp, Mile High Assaults: Air Car-
rier Liability Under the Warsaw Convention, 66 J. AIR L. & COM. 1551 (2001). See also
Davis L. Wright, Flying the Overly Friendly Skies: Expanding the Definition of an “Acci-
dent” Under the Warsaw Convention to Include Co-Passenger Sexual Assaults, 46 VILL. L.
REV. 453 (2001).
60 Wallace v. Korean Air, 214 F.3d 293, 296 (2d Cir. 2000) (citations omitted).
61 HAMILTON, supra note 36, at 186–87 (discussing the “Modernization of the
‘Warsaw System’” and noting it “should be recognized as a tweaking, a fine-tun-
ing of the Warsaw Convention, rather than a rejection and replacement of that
system.”).
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provisions of the Montreal Convention.”62 Both the Warsaw and
Montreal Conventions “provide[ ] international air passengers’
exclusive remed[ies] for claims governed by [either] treaty.”63
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit explained the
interplay between the two conventions:
The Warsaw Convention continues to govern disputes involving
parties from countries that are signatories to the Warsaw Conven-
tion but not signatories to the Montreal Convention. Russia, for
example, is a party to the Warsaw Convention and did not ratify
the Montreal Convention until 2017, so the Warsaw Convention
would govern claims against Russian airlines arising from inci-
dents that occurred prior to Russia’s ratification of the Montreal
Convention.64
Both the Warsaw Convention and Montreal Convention sub-
ject airlines to strict liability for personal injury; however, under
the Montreal Convention, the airline may avoid liability if it
proves it was not a proximate cause of the injury.65 Additionally,
both treaties affect what recovery is available to international
passengers.66 Originally, the Warsaw Convention capped the air-
lines’ liability to each passenger at $8,300. 67 This was later
amended by the Montreal Agreement—not to be confused with
the Montreal Convention—raising the cap to $75,000 per inter-
national passenger.68 Under the Montreal Convention, damages
for international passengers are capped at 100,000 units each,
known as Special Drawing Rights (SDRs), meant to simplify in-
ternational use and valued at $155,000 in 201169 and around
$137,542 in July of 2019.70 The International Monetary Fund
62 Doe v. Etihad Airways, P.J.S.C., 870 F.3d 406, 411 (6th Cir. 2017) (citing In re
Air Crash at Lexington, Ky., 501 F. Supp. 2d 902, 907–08 (E.D. Ky. 2007) (high-
lighting the vital importance of the Warsaw Convention’s jurisprudential history
to understanding the Montreal Convention)).
63 Id. at 412 (citing El Al Isr. Airlines, Ltd. v. Tsui Yuan Tseng, 525 U.S. 155,
168–69 (1999) (holding that plaintiff could not state a claim for remedy unless
plaintiff could under the Warsaw Convention)).
64 Id. at 411 n.4.
65 HAMILTON, supra note 36, at 187, 189.
66 See id. at 167.
67 Wallace v. Korean Air, 214 F.3d 293, 296 (2d Cir. 2000).
68 Id. at 297.
69 See HAMILTON, supra note 36, at 187.
70 For exact determinations of SDR value, two websites were consulted: The
Currency Converter, COINMILL, https://coinmill.com/SDR_calculator.html#
SDR=100000 [https://perma.cc/BUV9-76KV] (last visited July 31, 2019); and
SDR Valuation, INT’L MONETARY FUND, https://www.imf.org/external/np/fin/
data/rms_sdrv.aspx [https://perma.cc/R9JS-3TRW] (last visited July 31, 2019).
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(IMF) calculates the value of the SDR through a complex
formula using five international currencies, and this continuous
variable adds further difficulty for passengers attempting to un-
derstand their recovery rights.71 Furthermore, both the Warsaw
and Montreal Conventions bar international passengers from re-
covering against the airline for pure mental anguish72 or puni-
tive damages.73 Both conventions permit the use of domestic law
to determine how damages are calculated.74
In other words, Julie, from the earlier hypothetical, if as-
saulted on February 3, 2019, an international passenger flying
within Texas airspace and limited by the Montreal Conven-
tion—the most generous of the treaties—would be unable to
recover for purely mental anguish or for punitive damage
claims.75 Any claims that she could bring against the airline
would then “pass-through” the treaty to the relevant domestic
law, likely chosen in another dizzying set of choice of law rules
set by the forum.76 Domestic law would then determine what
compensatory damages would be allowed.77 Whatever damages
are allowed would then be capped by the Montreal Convention
at $137,542.78
71 The IMF calculates the value of the SDR based on a basket of five currencies,
including the U.S. dollar, at specified ratios. While the ratios are set for five-year
terms, the value of the various currencies changes the value of the SDR on a daily
basis. This makes it even less likely that an international passenger could reasona-
bly know the exact limits on recovery prior to a lawsuit. For more information,
see Special Drawing Right (SDR) Factsheet, INT’L MONETARY FUND (Mar. 8, 2019),
https://www.imf.org/en/About/Factsheets/Sheets/2016/08/01/14/51/Spe-
cial-Drawing-Right-SDR [https://perma.cc/PB6V-9QLK] (last visited July 31,
2019).
72 CHARLES F. KRAUSE & KENT C. KRAUSE, 1 AVIATION TORT & REGULATORY LAW
1514 (2d ed. 2017–2018) (citing Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530
(1991)).
73 Id. at 1582.
74 Doe v. Etihad Airways, P.J.S.C., 870 F.3d 406, 434–36 (6th Cir. 2017) (hold-
ing that the Montreal Convention allows the use of domestic law to calculate
damages) (citing Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., 516 U.S. 217, 224–26
(1996) (holding that Article 24 in the Warsaw Convention reserves domestic law
the power to calculate damages)).
75 See Doe v. United Airlines, Inc., 73 Cal. Rptr. 3d 541, 546, 551 (Cal. App.
Dep’t Super. Ct. 2008) (explaining that, under the Warsaw Convention, a minor
victim could not recover for PTSD caused by sexual assault without a showing of
bodily injury).
76 Andrew J. Harakas & Jeff Ellis, Aviation Liability United States, in 1 AVIATION
LIABILITY 2019 (Andrew J. Harakas et al. eds., 2018), question 36.
77 Id.
78 See HAMILTON, supra note 36, at 187; The Currency Converter, supra note 70;
SDR Valuation, supra note 70.
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B. CRIMINAL CLAIMS: TEPID PENALTIES
Prosecutors may charge perpetrators of in-flight sexual as-
saults under state law or under federal law.79 For the sake of
brevity, this Comment will focus primarily on the applicable fed-
eral laws under which a suspected offender might be charged.
The United States has broadly defined its jurisdiction in mari-
time and aviation issues. Assaults on flights are brought under
this special maritime statute, 49 U.S.C. § 46506.80 Even interna-
tional flights not flying over any state, “belonging in whole or in
part to . . . any citizen [of the United States], or to any corpora-
tion created by or under the laws of the United States, or any
State, Territory, district, or possession thereof,” are within the
special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United
States.81 Furthermore, if an offense is committed either “by or
against a national of the United States” aboard “any foreign ves-
sel during a voyage having a scheduled departure from or arrival
in the United States,” it is also considered within the “special
maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States.”82
Under 18 U.S.C. § 113, offenders can be punished for an as-
sault occurring “within the special maritime and territorial juris-
diction of the United States.”83 Prosecutors may prosecute
offenders for abusive sexual contact under 18 U.S.C. § 2244.84
When offenses involve young children, some of the maximum
imprisonment limits can be doubled.85 Subsection (a) of § 2244
offers much higher sentences than subsection (b) (ten years to
life for some offenses); however those larger penalties are re-
served for sexual assaults based on force, threat, or rendering
the person unconscious, drugged, or intoxicated.86 Quite often,
in-flight sexual assaults occur after women or minors voluntarily
fall asleep, so these larger penalties are out of reach.87 Prosecu-
tors can obtain three-year sentences under § 2244(a)(2) for
79 See, e.g., United States v. Erramilli, No. 11 CR 0778, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
49318, at *29 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 4, 2013) (mem. op.).
80 See 49 U.S.C. § 46506 (2012).
81 18 U.S.C. § 7(5) (2012).
82 Id. § 7(8).
83 Id. § 113.
84 Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4,
§ 906, 127 Stat. 54, 124 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 113); 18 U.S.C. §§ 2242,
2244 (2012).
85 See § 2244(c).
86 Id. § 2241(a)–(b), pursuant to a claim under § 2244(a)(1).
87 See Sexual Assault Aboard Aircraft: Raising Awareness About a Serious Federal
Crime, supra note 21.
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sleeping victims by showing that assaults are based on sexual acts
taken while the victim was “incapable of appraising the nature of
the conduct” or “physically incapable of declining participation
in, or communicating unwillingness to engage in, that sexual
act.”88 Though § 2244(a), with its more stringent penalties,
would seem an ideal fit to protect sleeping victims, prosecutors
can find it difficult to prove sexual actions took place when the
testifying witness was asleep,89 or defendants may plead down to
§ 2244(b)’s lesser penalties.90
In the case involving the third victim of Erramilli, who was
flying home from Las Vegas with her husband only to awaken
with Erramilli’s hand under her shorts, prosecutors ended up
dropping the more serious indictment under § 2244(a) for the
lesser charge under § 2244(b).91 Prosecutors chose this route
because the victim could readily testify to the offender’s actions,
including the location of his hand, after she awoke.92 The onus
of testifying about acts occurring while the victim is asleep leads
to lower maximum sentences—in this case, reducing the possi-
bility from three years to two.93 In the end, Erramilli, now on his
third conviction for touching women’s breasts or thighs on air-
planes, “was sentenced to nine months’ imprisonment and one
year of supervised release.”94
Given the relatively low sentences for actions taken while a
victim is asleep and the difficulty of showing exactly what actions
were taken while the victim was asleep, criminal convictions may
frequently result in less than two-year convictions for sexual as-
saults on an airplane. This provides little deterrence or preven-
tion when a person convicted of three in-flight offenses might
board another airplane beside a sleeping woman later that year.
88 18 U.S.C. §§ 2244(a)(2), 2242(2)(A)–(B).
89 United States v. Erramilli, 788 F.3d 723, 726 (7th Cir. 2015) (noting that the
government had voluntarily dismissed the more severely punishable indictment
under § 2244(a)(2) due to “insufficient evidence that Erramilli made contact
with [the victim]’s inner thigh (or any other area listed in the statute) while she
was asleep”).
90 See Wallace v. Korean Air, 214 F.3d 293, 295 (2d Cir. 2000) (noting that the
offender had pled to § 2244(b)).
91 Erramilli, 788 F.3d at 726.
92 Id.
93 Compare § 2244(a)(2) (listing the maximum imprisonment as “not more
than three years”), with § 2244(b) (listing the maximum imprisonment as “not
more than two years”).
94 Erramilli, 788 F.3d at 725, 727.
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The current state of the law, allowing for the possibility of civil
recovery and criminal convictions, does not do enough to pre-
vent or deter future in-flight assaults. Since the laws are in-
tended as remedies post-offense, they may result in few
consequences for airlines and offenders, and because passen-
gers are unaware of their protections and penalties, it is doubt-
ful that these measures serve as any meaningful deterrent to
these crimes.
In the past, when passengers’ safety has been threatened by
other passengers, society has not relied simply on remedies and
punishment. Instead, the government has implemented pre-
ventative measures to screen for weapons and to prevent known
offenders from gaining access to these particularly vulnerable
environments. In the case of terrorists, the law not only created
enhanced screening, but it also created watchlists designed to
prevent and deter future terrorist acts.95 Additionally, where in-
dividuals have been convicted as sex offenders, society has cho-
sen to implement measures to prevent and deter future
offenses. Society already limits sex offenders’ freedom of move-
ment and other freedoms, and the Supreme Court has upheld
such restrictions as constitutional.96
This Comment will suggest that, just as the law prevents sus-
pected terrorists’ access to flights to prevent violence against
passengers and restricts sexual offenders’ access to other vulner-
able groups to prevent sexual assaults, the law should restrict
access of those convicted of in-flight sexual assaults by creating
the Offender No-Fly List (ONFL). First, it is important to note
the history of these kind of watchlists and how the terrorist No-
Fly List (the No-Fly List) functions.
V. A HISTORY OF PREVENTION
America developed protective screening at airports in re-
sponse to the skyjackings of the 1960s.97 “The first hijacking of
an American commercial aircraft occurred in 1961.”98 In re-
95 See Eric Hedlund, Comment, Good Intentions, Bad Results, and Ineffective Re-
dress: The Story of the No Fly and Selectee Lists and a Suggestion for Change, 79 J. AIR L.
& COM. 597, 601 (2014).
96 E.g., Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 371 (1997) (holding that a Kansas
law legalizing the civil commitment of previously convicted pedophiles did not
violate due process).
97 See Daniel S. Harawa, The Post-TSA Airport: A Constitution Free Zone?, 41 PEPP.
L. REV. 1, 7–8 (2013).
98 United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 897 (9th Cir. 1973).
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sponse, Congress passed a statute making hijacking an airplane
a federal crime.99 Under this statute, an airline could refuse to
transport a passenger or her property if “in the opinion of the
air carrier, such transportation would or might be inimical to
safety of flight.”100 One American flight was skyjacked each year
on average from 1961 to 1968.101 In 1968, eighteen aircraft were
hijacked, and in 1969, thirty-three United States planes were hi-
jacked in forty attempts.102 In 1968, a taskforce under the Fed-
eral Aviation Administration (FAA), working with other
government departments and air carriers, created a system to
prevent hijackings including a “profile” of potential hijackers,
use of magnetometers for detecting metal on passengers, and
“weapons search[es] of the carry-on luggage and/or person of
anyone who activated the magnetometer.”103
“By September 1970, approximately 400 United States deputy
marshals were assigned to surveillance and search activities at
airport boarding gates.”104 Around this time, President Nixon
unveiled “A Program to Deal with Airplane Hijacking,” in-
structing the Department of Transportation to further these
procedures by having “airlines extend the use of surveillance
equipment and techniques to all appropriate airports in the
United States.”105 At the same time, the President committed
the federal government to supplying officers to operate the
equipment, search passengers, and make arrests.106 By January
5, 1973, the FAA required that all passengers be screened by
magnetometer and all carry-on baggage be searched.107 The gov-
ernment made few major changes to these laws until 2001.
Prior to September 11, 2001 (9/11), the FAA still oversaw avi-
ation security in the United States.108 At this time, the FAA fo-
cused its efforts primarily on preventing sabotage, since it
99 Harawa, supra note 97, at 8 (citing Act of Jan. 3, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-197, 75
Stat. 466, 466–68).
100 Davis, 482 F.2d at 897–98 (quoting Pub. L. No. 87-191, § 4, 75 Stat. 466,
467–68) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 1511)).
101 Harawa, supra note 97, at 8.
102 Davis, 482 F.2d at 898.
103 Id.
104 Id. at 899.
105 Id.
106 Id. at 899–900.
107 Id. at 901–02.
108 Hedlund, supra note 95, at 601 (citing NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST AT-
TACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 82 (2004) [hereinafter 9/11
COMM’N REPORT]).
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perceived hijacking to be a lesser threat.109 Despite implement-
ing a multi-layered defense of various screening measures, these
layers were “seriously flawed.”110 At the time, the FAA had a “no-
fly” list that contained the name of twelve suspected terrorists,
despite the fact that the Gore Commission had recommended
the FBI and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) provide their
lists of thousands of “known and suspected terrorists” to the FAA
to improve screening.111 On the day of the 9/11 attacks, the
metal detectors were “calibrated to detect items with at least the
metal content of a .22-caliber handgun.”112 The metal detectors
and X-ray devices often failed to detect FAA test items during
this era.113 Additionally, knives with blades under four inches
were not prohibited under FAA rules.114 In perhaps the most
chilling statement of the 9/11 Commission Report, the investi-
gators concluded:
The 19 men were aboard four transcontinental flights. They were
planning to hijack these planes and turn them into large guided
missiles, loaded with up to 11,400 gallons of jet fuel. By 8:00 A.M.
on the morning of Tuesday, September 11, 2001, they had de-
feated all the security layers that America’s civil aviation security
system then had in place to prevent a hijacking.115
After 9/11, the government drafted a multi-pronged ap-
proach to enhance the nation’s civil aviation security system.
Congress passed the Aviation and Transportation Security Act
(ATSA), under which aviation security now fell under the Trans-
portation Security Administration (TSA)—a new organization
under the Department of Transportation.116 Congress man-
dated that the transfer of power occur within three months of
passing the ATSA.117 In order to prevent future hijacking of
cockpits, the ATSA required changes to flight-deck door and
cockpit procedures.118 The ATSA also necessitated passenger
and crew manifests including the full name, date of birth, citi-
109 9/11 COMM’N REPORT, supra note 108, at 82.
110 Id. at 83.
111 Id.
112 Id. at 2.
113 Id. at 84.
114 Id.
115 Id. at 4 (footnotes omitted).
116 Aviation and Transportation Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-71, § 101, 115
Stat. 597, 597–98 (2001) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 114).
117 Id. § 101(g)(1), 115 Stat. at 603.
118 Id. § 104(a), 115 Stat. at 605–06.
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zenship, and gender of travelers.119 Additionally, TSA was em-
powered to “provide for deployment of Federal air marshals on
every passenger flight of air carriers in air transportation or in-
trastate air transportation.”120 Passenger fees added after 9/11
provided funding for the air marshals,121 and the Act required
the airlines to provide a seat to them at no charge.122
In addition to these changes, “interagency sharing of watch
list information became a larger focus.”123 The 9/11 Commis-
sion Report recommended the increased use of watchlists,124
and the “Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act . . .
of 2004 codified this recommendation into law.”125 Today, much
of this authority comes from 49 U.S.C. § 114(f) and (h).126 The
Terrorist Screening Center (TSC), administered by the FBI127
and instituted in response to President George W. Bush’s Presi-
dential Directive 6, “created[ ] and maintains[ ] the consoli-
dated terrorist watchlist called the Terrorist Screening Database
(TSDB).”128 The No-Fly List is a “subset” of the TSDB,129 as is the
Selectee List.130 Both were created in response to the 9/11 at-
tacks and the 9/11 Commission Report.
VI. ALTERNATIVE PREVENTATIVE MEASURSES
Given the many different preventative measures used to re-
spond to the 9/11 attacks, many would favor alternative solu-
tions to preventing in-flight sexual assaults. Those alternative
119 Id. § 115, 115 Stat. at 623 (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 44909
(c)(2)).
120 Id. § 105(a), 115 Stat. at 607 (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 44917
(a)(1)).
121 Id. § 118(a), 115 Stat. at 625 (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 44940
(a)(1)(D)).
122 Id. § 105(a), 115 Stat. at 607 (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 44917
(a)(4)).
123 Hedlund, supra note 95, at 601.
124 9/11 COMM’N REPORT, supra note 108, at 393.
125 Dan Lowe, Note, The Flap with No Fly—Does the No Fly List Violate Privacy and
Due Process Constitutional Protections?, 92 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 157, 165 (2015).
126 49 U.S.C. § 114(f), (h) (2012); see also TRANSP. SEC. ADMIN., DHS/TSA/PIA-
018(h), PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT UPDATE FOR SECURE FLIGHT 3 (2017) [herein-
after PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT].
127 Latif v. Holder, 28 F. Supp. 3d 1134, 1141 (D. Or. 2014).
128 Hedlund, supra note 95, at 602.
129 Mohamed v. Holder, 266 F. Supp. 3d 868, 873 (E.D. Va. 2017).
130 Lowe, supra note 125, at 160.
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solutions do not actually deter or prevent future assaults.131 For
instance, it is virtually undisputed that flight attendants need
training on how to handle in-flight sexual assault situations.132
Flight attendants largely have not been trained to handle these
situations. Both Congress and flight attendants agree that train-
ing should be provided, and the recently passed omnibus spend-
ing bill of March 23, 2018, moves for better training, reporting,
and record-keeping measures by the airlines in regard to sexual
assaults.133 While better training for flight attendants will help
suffering victims and possibly garner better evidence for cases, it
focuses on how to respond to sexual assaults and does little to
prevent or deter them. It is a much-needed improvement, but
without other action, it is an insufficient response.
Neither would the use of air marshals on flights solve the
problem. Federal air marshals, already provided for by provi-
sions implemented after 9/11, seem to be an obvious solution to
deter in-flight sexual assaults. As previously noted, air marshals
are funded through security fees,134 though the airline must pro-
vide the seat at no cost, regardless of whether or not the flight is
full.135 Currently, air marshals are used on international and do-
mestic flights deemed high-risk by intelligence agencies.136
While TSA may provide for air marshals on every flight, it must
only do so when the flight is “determined by the Administrator
to present high security risks.”137 Air marshals largely do not
identify themselves to other passengers, and they attempt to sur-
reptitiously monitor situations, only intervening when neces-
sary.138 They intervene during in-flight assaults only if the “flight
131 See, e.g., Marisa Garcia, Inflight Sexual Harassment Incidents Demand Better Re-
sponse, RUNWAY GIRL NETWORK (Jan. 15, 2019), https://runwaygirlnetwork.com/
2019/01/15/inflight-sexual-harassment-incidents-highlight-need-for-better-re-
sponse/ [https://perma.cc/XW9H-943D].
132 See, e.g., De Diego et al., supra note 19; Nathan Wilson, Unsafe Skies: Sexual
Assaults on Airliners a Growing Problem, KOMONEWS (Sept. 18, 2017), https://
komonews.com/news/local/mid-flight-sexual-assaults-a-growing-problem
[https://perma.cc/Z22X-GSJZ] (last visited on Aug. 14, 2019).
133 #MeToo in the Air, supra note 22.
134 49 U.S.C. § 44940(a)(1)(D) (2012).
135 Id. § 44917(a)(4).
136 Id. § 44917(a)(1)–(2); DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR
GEN., OIG-09-64, ROLE OF THE NO FLY AND SELECTEE LISTS IN SECURING COMMER-
CIAL AVIATION 35 (2009), https://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/OIGr_09-
64_Jul09.pdf [https://perma.cc/B8ZQ-45HS].
137 49 U.S.C. § 44917(a)(1)–(2).
138 See Everett Potter, Five Myths About Air Marshals, USA TODAY (Aug. 7, 2014),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/travel/flights/2014/08/07/5-myths-about-air-
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crew has exhausted its ability to handle a situation.”139 These
officers remain hidden because they are intended as the “last
line of defense for U.S.-flagged aircraft” in the event of a
hijacking.140
Given this clandestine approach, air marshals do not serve as
the deterrent that a uniformed officer would. Air marshals
would only respond to situations already addressed by flight at-
tendants and would only prevent the escape of an accused of-
fender or further assault.141 None of this would deter an assault,
since the passengers would not know the air marshal was aboard
the flight. Changing the furtive approach currently used by air
marshals would inevitably hinder their ability to prevent terror-
ist hijackings, so the safety of passengers is not best served
through such a change.142
Furthermore, air marshals guard an extremely small percent-
age of flights—estimated by one former air marshal as one half
of one percent of U.S. flights.143 Their numbers would need to
be increased exponentially to supply the over 75,000 air mar-
shals needed to cover all the flights across the United States, and
considering the air marshal budget is already decreasing, that
does not seem likely.144
Nor does it seem likely that the airlines could provide 75,000
security guards aboard flights that could properly address this
issue.145 Having visible security officers on flights might provide
a factor of deterrence, but the challenges created might negate
any factor. Airlines will certainly not want the added liability of
attempting to screen hazardous situations from innocuous
ones.146 Distinguishing nefarious acts from ordinary acts of lov-
ing relationships opens up enormous difficulty for anyone at-
tempting to accomplish such a task. The chance of false





142 See Clay W. Biles, How 9/11 Changed the Federal Air Marshal System, BUS. IN-
SIDER (Dec. 16, 2013), https://www.businessinsider.com/5-ways-federal-air-mar
shals-have-changed-since-911-2013-12 [https://perma.cc/N47E-QDJH].
143 Potter, supra note 138.
144 See id.
145 See, e.g., Elliott Hester, Keeping Passengers Safe from Aircraft Predators, L.A.
TIMES (Feb. 4, 2018), https://www.latimes.com/travel/la-tr-fly-guy-20180204-
story.html [https://perma.cc/DMJ5-NFMJ].
146 Cf. Karp, supra note 59, at 1561–64.
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positives for intervention seems enormous. Should security wake
up passengers who appear to be sleeping if a man has his arm
around a woman? What if they are sharing a blanket? Should
security intervene anytime a person touches a sleeping passen-
ger? These issues raise a tremendous possibility for security to
act on stereotypes and prejudices.147 Security may become timid
after false accusations, so their real assistance would be after an
in-flight assault. That is certainly a benefit, but it still does little
to prevent or deter future in-flight assaults.
The government’s use of the No-Fly List to provide compre-
hensive protection supplemented by air marshals speaks to the
List’s ability to protect passengers. Accordingly, analyzing the
functioning of the current No-Fly List is important to under-
stand how the ONFL could protect passengers, even if supple-
mented by other solutions.
VII. THE NO-FLY LIST: HOW IT WORKS
The No-Fly List and the Selectee List function differently. “In-
dividuals on the No-Fly List are prohibited from traveling on
commercial aircraft. Individuals on the Selectee List are permit-
ted to fly but receive secondary screening at airport security
checkpoints.”148 Because the No-Fly List bears a closer resem-
blance to the proposed ONFL, and because the Selectee List
purportedly raises fewer due process issues,149 this Comment will
focus on the function of the No-Fly List from here on.
According to TSA:
Individuals may be nominated to a TSA Watch List based on in-
telligence or law enforcement information specific to the individ-
ual, or their involvement in a security incident that indicates they
may pose, or are suspected of posing, (1) a threat to transporta-
tion or national security, (2) a threat of air piracy or terrorism,
147 See Jerald Monahan & Sheila Polk, The Effect of Cultural Bias on the Investiga-
tion and Prosecution of Sexual Assault, POLICE CHIEF MAG., https://www.policechief
magazine.org/the-effect-of-cultural-bias-on-the-investigation/ [https://
perma.cc/J7AU-TGQT] (last visited Aug. 16, 2019).
148 Scherfen v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 3:CV-08-1554, 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 8336, at *7–8 (M.D. Pa. 2010) (citing a Department of Homeland Security
letter sent to the plaintiff).
149 See Mohamed v. Holder, 266 F. Supp. 3d 868, 879 & n.13 (E.D. Va. 2017)
(distinguishing Green v. Transp. Sec. Admin., 351 F. Supp. 2d 1119, 1128–30
(W.D. Wash. 2005) from the case at bar because the Selectee List does not serve
as a complete ban on international flights as the No-Fly List does).
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(3) a threat to airline or passenger safety or (4) a threat to civil
aviation security.150
The TSC “generally accepts those nominations on a showing of
‘reasonable suspicion’ that the individuals are known or sus-
pected terrorists based on the totality of the information.”151 A
reasonable suspicion has been met if the “articulable facts
which, taken together with rational inferences, reasonably war-
rant the determination that an individual ‘is known or suspected
to be, or has been engaged in conduct constituting, in prepara-
tion for, in aid of or related to, terrorism or terrorist activi-
ties.’”152 TSA has indicated that no one may be added to the No-
Fly List “based solely” on “real or perceived race, color, religion,
national origin, ethnicity, gender, age, sexual orientation, gen-
der identity[,] or disability,” but it concedes that such things
“may be considered under the totality-of-the-circumstances . . .
where it is both relevant and based on specific intelligence or
threat information.”153
If an individual has been denied boarding, the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) Traveler Redress Inquiry Program
(TRIP) “is the mechanism available . . . to seek redress for any
travel-related screening issues.”154 Travelers may send an email,
complete an online form, or use conventional mail to begin an
administrative review, and if there is a misidentification with
someone on the No-Fly List, then the TSC begins corrective
steps.155 Whether the report uncovers a mistake or an accurate
restriction largely remains a mystery after the review, since DHS
sends a determination letter that “neither confirms nor denies”
whether the traveler is in the TSDB or on the No-Fly List.156
From here, the traveler can either begin an administrative ap-
peal or seek judicial review.157 In the end, the No-Fly List oper-
ates on secret nominations and occasionally hinders the
transportation of some people who arguably have no reason to
be on the list.158
150 PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT, supra note 126, at 4.
151 Latif v. Holder, 28 F. Supp. 3d 1134, 1141 (D. Or. 2014).
152 Id.
153 PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT, supra note 126, at 4.
154 Latif, 28 F. Supp. 3d at 1141.
155 Id.
156 See id. at 1142.
157 Id.
158 See Gregory Krieg, No-Fly Nightmares: The Program’s Most Embarrassing Mis-
takes, CNN (Dec. 7, 2015), https://www.cnn.com/2015/12/07/politics/no-fly-
mistakes-cat-stevens-ted-kennedy-john-lewis/index.html [https://perma.cc/
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VIII. A PREVENTATIVE SOLUTION TO IN-FLIGHT
SEXUAL ASSUALT: THE OFFENDER NO-FLY LIST
The ONFL would retain the strengths of the No-Fly List and
avoid many of its pitfalls. It would provide actual deterrence
without erroneously restricting the freedoms of the innocent, as
the No-Fly List is apt to.159 The requirements for being added to
the list would be clear and easily avoidable. To be on the list, a
person must be convicted of an in-flight sexual assault in a crimi-
nal proceeding under any one of the offenses in 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2241–2244.160 Not everyone convicted of a sexual assault
would be on this list—only those who had committed the of-
fense on a flight. The scope of the ONFL is intentionally narrow
to protect the safety of airline passengers who are often in a
uniquely vulnerable position—restricted to assigned seats, in
dark cabins, next to strangers, often while falling asleep. This
narrow application reduces the risk of errors and due process
issues.161
Offenders would only be on the list for a set period of time.162
Much like supervised release, one offense would not lead to a
lifetime ban. Judges could be provided a guideline range, like
they have when committing an offender to supervised release,
ensuring some uniformity while also allowing judicial discretion
in sentencing. Offenders could always appeal admission to the
ONFL or the duration of their inclusion on it through normal
appellate procedures. Should offenders desire to be released
from the list earlier, they could complete programs designed to
P6FC-DG7J] (last visited Apr. 26, 2019) (reporting about journalists and children
possibly being placed on the No-Fly list).
159 See Drastic Drop in Number of Unruly Passengers After Introduction of No-Fly List:
Report, MONEYCONTROL NEWS (June 28, 2018), https://www.moneycontrol.com/
news/trends/current-affairs-trends/drastic-drop-in-number-of-unruly-passengers-
after-introduction-of-no-fly-list-report-2644481.html [https://perma.cc/337S-
3YY3] (explaining how a similar No-Fly List implemented in India has success-
fully deterred incidents).
160 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2241–2244 (2012).
161 Cf. William Mann, Comment, All the (Air) Rage: Legal Implications Surround-
ing Airline and Government Bans on Unruly Passengers in the Sky, 65 J. AIR L. & COM.
857, 878 (2000) (stating that banning passengers from flying without a hearing or
when they do not have criminal convictions would violate due process).
162 See In First Case After Govt’s ‘No-Fly List’, Woman Escorted Off Indigo Flight,
ECON. TIMES (Sept. 13, 2017), https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/
transportation/airlines-/-aviation/in-first-case-after-govts-no-fly-list-woman-escor
ted-off-indigo-flight/articleshow/60493218.cms [https://perma.cc/DR3X-44E3]
(explaining how India’s version of a similar offender No-Fly List only bans pas-
sengers for a limited period of time).
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reform sex offenders to stress the importance of consent instead
of assuming a woman wants sexual contact.163 Should offenders
recidivate, their future admissions to the ONFL would be calcu-
lated on a substantially higher range and capped with a perma-
nent ban.164
The ONFL would be a list operated by TSA separate from the
No-Fly-List. When individuals are convicted of one of the of-
fenses, they would be added to this list by the judiciary. TSA is
the appropriate entity to keep this list because, under 49 U.S.C.
§ 114(h)(2), TSA is tasked with notifying appropriate authori-
ties of those that pose a risk to passenger safety.165 Certainly
those who have recently been convicted of in-flight passenger
assault and have been deemed too dangerous to be permitted to
board at this time also pose a risk to passenger safety.166 Addi-
tionally, TSA will need the list should an offender attempt to
violate the ONFL and board a plane. Since none of the classified
information from the terror No-Fly List would be attached, TSA
could readily remind a person denied boarding that he or she is
on this list.
If the ONFL were implemented, it would provide greater de-
terrence against those who might commit these offenses. Exam-
ining the effectiveness of the No-Fly List is difficult, but there
are two sources demonstrating its effectiveness, and these give
an indication of the effectiveness of the ONFL.
First, various groups across the government have seen the No-
Fly List as an effective preventative measure. A DHS Office of
the Inspector General report from 2009 found that the No-Fly
List and Selectee List were effectively identifying those who
threatened aviation security.167 Public document reports give
few details explaining these conclusions; however, Congress, a
body made up of those who are privy to the full information, has
shown a desire to expand the use of these lists. Recently, Demo-
cratic members of the House have moved to create a No-Fly, No
163 On two separate occasions of sexual assault, Erramilli claimed to believe the
women liked what he was doing. See United States v. Erramilli, 788 F.3d 723, 727
(7th Cir. 2015); United States v. Erramilli, No. 11 CR 0778, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
49318, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 4, 2013).
164 See Drastic Drop in Number of Unruly Passengers After Introduction of No-Fly List:
Report, supra note 159 (comparing India’s ban, which provides for increased lim-
its for recidivists and possibly a permanent ban).
165 49 U.S.C. § 114(h)(2) (2012).
166 See Karp, supra note 59, at 1552–54.
167 ROLE OF THE NO FLY AND SELECTEE LISTS IN SECURING COMMERCIAL AVIA-
TION, supra note 136, at 26.
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Buy law.168 Essentially, the law would either prevent those on the
lists from purchasing a gun, or at least require notification to
the FBI if someone attempted to do so.169 The legislation has
been mirrored in the Senate.170 In proposing such legislation, it
seems that at least some on both sides of the aisle and in both
chambers have found these terrorist watch lists an effective pre-
ventative measure.171
Second, brief glimpses of the No-Fly List in action show that it
is effective. National security considerations undoubtedly make
it difficult for the average citizen to know of the No-Fly List’s
moments of successful prevention. However, in one of the rare
exceptions, in 2010, Faisal Shahzad planted a bomb at Times
Square and then attempted to flee to Dubai, but he was appre-
hended on the plane by the FBI.172 The FBI added Shahzad to
the No-Fly List that day and notified the airlines to check the
updated list within three minutes of adding him.173 While the
airline failed to heed the warning before Shahzad boarded the
plane, it submitted the final passenger list prior to takeoff, and
Customs and Border Protection agents had him arrested
immediately.174
Though this story was reported as a near failure, the system
put in place after 9/11 allowed the suspect to be added to the
list and airlines notified within minutes.175 This is a drastic im-
provement compared to the porous and fragmented system de-
scribed in the 9/11 Commission Report and easily evaded by the
terrorists that day.176 The message was clear, even if terrorists
somehow made it through security by human error, they were
168 Eric Lichtblau, After Orlando, Questions Over Effectiveness of Terrorism Watch
Lists, N.Y. TIMES (June 22, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/23/us/
politics/after-orlando-questions-over-terrorism-watch-lists.html [https://
perma.cc/HSA7-LNTS] (last visited Aug. 13, 2019); see also David M. Her-
szenhorn, Bipartisan Senate Group Proposes ‘No Fly, No Buy’ Gun Measure, N.Y. TIMES
(June 21, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/22/us/politics/senate-gun-
control-no-fly-list-terrorism.html [https://perma.cc/2j35-BP9B] (last visited Aug.
13, 2019).
169 See Lichtblau, supra note 168.
170 See Herszenhorn, supra note 168.
171 See id.
172 Scott Shane, Lapses Allowed Suspect to Board Plane, N.Y. TIMES (May 4, 2010),
https://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/05/nyregion/05plane.html [https://




176 See 9/11 COMM’N REPORT, supra note 108, at 4.
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still not free. The No-Fly List’s continued updates and checks by
screeners create continuously active layers of protection against
those on the list.177 The No-Fly List was effective—it prevented
Shahzad, a terrorist, from escaping, and it sent a message to
others who planned to cause harm and quickly escape through
the air.178
Given the No-Fly List’s broad support by DHS and Congress’s
bipartisan support to use the No-Fly List in other areas, the
value of using the ONFL as a preventative measure here should
not be doubted. Just as with the No-Fly List, the ONFL would
not be a one-time chance at preventing harm. It too would pro-
vide continued screening of passengers by allowing airlines to
repeatedly check their passenger manifests against the ONFL.
This makes the chance of an offender violating this list and get-
ting caught substantially higher than if he only had to make it
through security—an already daunting task.
In addition to providing new deterrence, the ONFL would en-
hance current federal penalties. Even when the lesser penalty of
18 U.S.C. § 2244(b) was used due to difficulty proving that the
victim was asleep,179 the ONFL would enhance the penalty from
what might have been only a few months of incarceration to an
added number of years without the ability to fly.180 Additionally,
this penalty would likely motivate prosecutors to convict under
the federal statutes instead of the state statutes, giving the FBI
more accurate numbers of actual offenses. Bringing the convic-
tions more uniformly under the federal statutes and preventing
offender boarding would provide more comfort to victims and
other passengers. Victims would know at least some of the penal-
ties that would be handed down for these offenses, and they
would know that future flights would be safer. Repeat offenders
currently suffer no greater penalties for continuing to perpetu-
ate in-flight assaults, but under the ONFL, Erramilli would likely
have never been on the flight to commit his third offense.181
Airports would become sterile environments not only from sus-
pected terrorists but also from offenders of in-flight sexual as-
177 See ROLE OF THE NO FLY AND SELECTEE LISTS IN SECURING COMMERCIAL AVIA-
TION, supra note 136, at 5.
178 See Shane, supra note 172.
179 United States v. Erramilli, 788 F.3d 723, 726 (7th Cir. 2015).
180 See 18 U.S.C. § 2244(b) (2012).
181 See Erramilli, 788 F.3d at 728.
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saults.182 Despite all of these benefits, the ONFL’s similarity to
the No-Fly List will certainly raise objections similar to those re-
garding the No-Fly List.
IX. PRESERVING DUE PROCESS AND DETERRING
OFFENSES
A number of objections have been made against terrorist
watchlists, and many of these take the form of procedural and
substantive due process claims.183 This Comment will look at the
various constitutional challenges to the terrorist No-Fly List, and
then explain why the argument would either prove less prob-
lematic for or not apply to the proposed in-flight sexual of-
fender no-fly list.
A. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS CHALLENGES
Substantive due process challenges facing the No-Fly List
center around a deprivation of the right to travel. Unlike proce-
dural due process, this is about protecting freedoms from gov-
ernment infringement “regardless of the fairness of the
procedures used.”184 Domestic travel among states has been
held to be a fundamental right—one subject to strict scrutiny.185
This standard “forbids the government to infringe . . . ‘funda-
mental’ liberty interests at all, no matter what process is pro-
vided, unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling state interest.”186
In Saenz v. Roe, a class action suit was brought challenging a
California statute that would normally restrict welfare claims of
those who had resided in-state less than twelve months to a
lower welfare benefit.187 The Supreme Court held that the right
to travel includes “at least three different components.”188
It protects the right of a citizen of one State to enter and to leave
another State, the right to be treated as a welcome visitor rather
182 See PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT, supra note 126, at 1, 4–5 (defining a “sterile
area” as a TSA-controlled “portion of an airport” that provides “access to board-
ing aircraft”).
183 See Lowe, supra note 125, at 170–72; Hedlund, supra note 95, at 618–21.
184 Mohamed v. Holder, 266 F. Supp. 3d 868, 876 (E.D. Va. 2017).
185 JEFFERY D. KAHN, MRS. SHIPLEY’S GHOST: THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL AND TERROR-
IST WATCHLISTS 59 (2013).
186 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (quoting Reno v. Flo-
res, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993)).
187 Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 492, 496 (1999).
188 Id. at 500.
254 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [84
than an unfriendly alien when temporarily present in the second
State, and, for those travelers who elect to become permanent
residents, the right to be treated like other citizens of that
State.189
Despite the incredibly high bar against restricting a person’s
fundamental right to domestic travel, a person does not enjoy a
fundamental right to domestic flight. “[B]urdens on a single
mode of transportation do not implicate the right to interstate
travel.”190 Consequently, in Gilmore v. Gonzales, where a man re-
fused to show identification as required to board a domestic
flight, denying him entry to the flight did not violate his consti-
tutional rights.191
International travel has historically been afforded less protec-
tion than domestic travel.192 The Supreme Court has demon-
strated that international travel is a freedom and not a
fundamental right. The “freedom to travel outside the United
States must be distinguished from the right to travel within the
United States.”193 While interstate travel remains a “virtually un-
qualified” constitutional right, international travel is merely “an
aspect of the ‘liberty’ protected by the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment.”194
Consequently, substantive due process challenges to interna-
tional travel are not subject to the exacting standard of strict
scrutiny but rather the much lower rational basis standard.195
This is a very low bar. Under this standard, the government only
needs to demonstrate that the legislation is “reasonably related”
to the stated purpose.196
The ONFL is intended to promote public safety by protecting
potential victims of sexual assault on a plane from those con-
189 Id.
190 Gilmore v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 1125, 1137 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Miller v.
Reed, 176 F.3d 1202, 1205 (9th Cir. 1999)).
191 Id. at 1129–30.
192 See KAHN, supra note 185, at 73 (discussing how “the Supreme Court’s ana-
lytical approach to domestic travel weakened its appreciation for the right to for-
eign travel.”).
193 Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 306 (1981).
194 Id. at 307; see also Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125 (1958) (holding “[t]he
right to travel is a part of the ‘liberty’ of which the citizen cannot be deprived
without due process of law under the Fifth Amendment.”).
195 Mohamed v. Holder, 266 F. Supp. 3d 868, 879 (E.D. Va. 2017); see also Law-
rence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 588 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that only
fundamental rights allow the use of any standard other than rational basis).
196 See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 735 (1997).
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victed of in-flight sexual assault offenses. This legislation is at
least rationally related to the task of promoting public safety—
its proposed intent. Therefore, it should survive any substantive
due process challenge involving either domestic or international
flights.197
In Mohamed v. Holder, a U.S. district court chose to apply strict
scrutiny to the terrorist No-Fly List after stating that individuals
have a fundamental right to fly.198 That court distinguished Gil-
more v. Gonzales, where the man would not show identification,
based on the fact the prohibition on flying, was not complete,
since he could have alternatively submitted to enhanced screen-
ing procedures.199 This overlooks the Gilmore court’s explicit ex-
planation for its reasoning: “We reject Gilmore’s right to travel
argument because the Constitution does not guarantee the right
to travel by any particular form of transportation.”200
Furthermore, the Mohamed court’s distinction of the No-Fly
List’s complete ban and the requirement to show identification
in Gilmore seems to revolve around choice.201 Those with no
identification still have a choice to fly, but those placed on the
No-Fly List are powerless to affect any other possibility—it is a
complete ban. In this case, the ONFL is not a complete ban. As
a part of the U.S. Code, every person would have notice that
committing a sexual assault on a plane would subject a person to
criminal prosecution and, if convicted, to a complete ban on
flights for a period of time. This affords passengers a choice just
as effectively, as was the case in Gilmore.202
If flying domestically was still found to be a fundamental
right, subjecting the ONFL to strict scrutiny, it should still sur-
vive the challenge. To meet this standard, the government
would need to show that the ONFL’s infringement on the right
to travel “is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling [govern-
ment] interest.”203
197 See id.; Mohamed, 266 F. Supp. 3d at 883.
198 Mohamed, 266 F. Supp. at 879–80, 879 n.13 (distinguishing precedent indi-
cating that a ban on domestic flying did not infringe on a fundamental right
because the case did not address “a complete ban” as implicated by the No-Fly List).
199 See id. at 879 n.13.
200 Gilmore v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 1125, 1136 (9th Cir. 2006).
201 See Mohamed, 266 F. Supp. 3d at 879 n.13.
202 Gilmore, 435 F.3d at 1135–36.
203 See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (quoting Reno v.
Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993)).
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In Mohamed, despite subjecting the No-Fly List to strict scru-
tiny, the court found that it met this standard and did not vio-
late due process.204 The court noted the deference afforded to
the No-Fly List due to the national security concerns impli-
cated.205 The ONFL’s public safety purpose is compelling, but
since national security is the most compelling interest possi-
ble,206 it will be less compelling than in the Mohamed analysis.
While this is undoubtedly true, the ONFL is so narrowly tailored
as to still pass strict scrutiny analysis. It would affect only the
class of subjects who have committed an in-flight sexual assault
through their free actions and who have been convicted in a
criminal proceeding beyond a reasonable doubt. Furthermore,
it is not a permanent ban but a temporary restraint subject to
argument at sentencing and appeal.
Society already restricts felons’ ability to purchase firearms—a
fundamental right under the Second Amendment—for public
safety reasons.207 Congress has proposed restricting this same
Second Amendment fundamental right for those on the No-Fly
List, where individuals on that list would have no convictions
and inclusion on that list may be permanent.208 The ONFL
seems easily permissible by comparison. Given this, the ONFL
should not violate substantive due process under whichever stan-
dard of review is used.
B. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS CHALLENGES
“Procedural due process imposes constraints on governmen-
tal decisions which deprive individuals of ‘liberty’ or ‘property’
interests within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment.”209 The Supreme Court stated
that “ ‘due process,’ unlike some legal rules, is not a technical
conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and
circumstances.”210 The Court allows administrative flexibility in
satisfying due process, and it analyzes rules by weighing the gov-
204 Mohamed, 266 F. Supp. 3d at 883.
205 Id. at 882.
206 See id.; Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981).
207 See Andrew Chung, U.S. Top Court Deals Setback to Gun Control Advocates on
Felon Ban, REUTERS (June 26, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-
court-guns-felons/u-s-top-court-deals-setback-to-gun-control-advocates-on-felon-
ban-idUSKBN19H1KZ [https://perma.cc/7J3L-8FQT].
208 See Herszenhorn, supra note 168.
209 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976) (emphasis omitted).
210 Id. at 334 (quoting Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895
(1961)).
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ernment and private interests, as found in three factors.211 In
deciding whether procedural due process has been violated,
courts apply the test from Mathews v. Eldridge, balancing:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official ac-
tion; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such inter-
est through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any,
of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the
Government’s interest, including the function involved and the
fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute
procedural requirement would entail.212
While most every challenge to the No-Fly List on due process
grounds has been rejected,213 in Latif v. Holder, the U.S. District
Court for the District of Oregon held that the plaintiffs’ inclu-
sion on the No-Fly List violated the “Plaintiffs’ rights to procedu-
ral due process.”214 Since so few cases have prevailed against the
No-Fly List, this Comment will thoroughly analyze the Latif case
and apply the reasoning to the proposed ONFL.215 This Com-
ment will show that, given the ONFL’s compliance with the
case’s requirements, it would not violate the procedural due
process of any individual on the list.
In Latif, thirteen U.S. citizens, the plaintiffs, “were denied
boarding on flights over United States airspace.”216 Due to this
act, and because some had been told so by airline or govern-
ment officials, the plaintiffs believed they were on the No-Fly
List.217 Each had attempted to follow the recommended admin-
istrative review procedures by filing DHS TRIP complaints, but
DHS responded with letters that in each case did “not confirm
or deny any Plaintiff’s name is on any terrorist watch list nor
provide a reason for any Plaintiff to be included in the TSDB or
on the No-Fly List.”218 Plaintiffs therefore contended that their
211 Id. at 334–35.
212 Id. at 335.
213 Lowe, supra note 125, at 157.
214 Latif v. Holder, 28 F. Supp. 3d 1134, 1161 (D. Or. 2014).
215 During the writing of this Comment, Elhady v. Piehota raised a procedural
due process challenge in the Eastern District of Virginia against the Terrorist
Screening Database (TSDB). Elhady v. Piehota, 303 F. Supp. 3d 453, 465, 468
(E.D. Va. 2017). The claims in that case are similar to the other cases discussed,
and since the TSDB underlies the No-Fly List, these arguments will raise the same
due process issues addressed in this section. This case would not likely change the
ONFL’s analysis, whatever the holding.
216 Latif, 28 F. Supp. 3d at 1143.
217 Id.
218 Id.
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Fifth Amendment right to procedural due process had been vio-
lated.219 The court applied the aforementioned Mathews test to
decide.220
The court first looked to see whether there was a “private in-
terest . . . affected by the official action.”221 The court found that
plaintiffs’ liberty of travel and reputations had likely been in-
fringed.222 The court held that “inclusion on the No-Fly List con-
stitute[d] a significant deprivation of [plaintiffs’] liberty
interests in international travel.”223 In deciding this, the court
first distinguished Gilmore v. Gonzales and Green v. Transportation
Security Administration.224
In Gilmore, mentioned above, a man was denied boarding on a
domestic flight after refusing to show identification, and the
court held that this did not violate his constitutional rights. 225
Similarly, in Green, passengers were subjected to “enhanced se-
curity screening,” and the court held there was no due process
violation because the plaintiffs did “not have a right to travel
without any impediments whatsoever.”226 The government cited
both cases in Latif to illustrate the lack of a constitutional right
to fly.227 The court distinguished these cases from the case at bar
because both Gilmore and Green dealt with interstate rather than
international travel, and the burdens in both cases were less
than the prohibition placed on the Latif plaintiffs via the No-Fly
List.228
The court found that the interstate versus international flight
distinction was important, since finding alternative transporta-
tion to a destination could be significantly more difficult when
addressing a ban on international flights.229 It stated:
Although there are viable alternatives to flying for domestic
travel within the continental United States such as traveling by
car or train, the Court disagrees with Defendants’ contention
that international air travel is a mere convenience in light of the
219 Id. at 1147.
220 Id.
221 Id. (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)).
222 Id. at 1151.
223 Id. at 1150.
224 Id. at 1148 (citing Gilmore v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir. 2006);
Green v. Transp. Sec. Admin., 351 F. Supp. 2d 1119 (W.D. Wash. 2005)).
225 Gilmore, 435 F.3d at 1129–30.
226 Green, 351 F. Supp. 2d at 1122, 1130.
227 Latif, 28 F. Supp. 3d at 1148.
228 Id. at 1148–49.
229 Id. at 1148.
2019] IN-FLIGHT SEXUAL ASSAULTS 259
realities of our modern world. Such an argument ignores the nu-
merous reasons that an individual may have for wanting or need-
ing to travel overseas quickly such as the birth of a child, the
death of a loved one, a business opportunity, or a religious
obligation.230
Here, the plaintiffs could not travel internationally by other
means such as boat or by land because of the cost in time and
money and the risk of being detained by other countries due to
their association with the No-Fly List.231 For some plaintiffs,
health constraints made them unable to handle the physical de-
mands of alternative modes of travel.232 The modern impor-
tance of international travel, combined with the difficulty for
these plaintiffs to find an alternative to flights, proved very im-
portant to the court.233
Further distinguishing the prior cases, the court stated that
being added to the No-Fly List was a much greater burden than
the “security-screening restrictions” in Gilmore and Green because
the No-Fly List is a “complete and indefinite ban on boarding
commercial flights.”234
The court held that, when dealing with international travel,
protected liberties can be infringed even if all modes of trans-
portation are not prohibited.235 Though this was not a ban on
every mode of international transportation, it proved enough to
infringe on the plaintiffs’ “protected liberty interest[s] in inter-
national travel.”236
Given the court’s emphasis on international travel as a pro-
tected liberty interest, offenders challenging ONFL restrictions
on international travel would have a substantially stronger case
than equivalent challenges relating to domestic flights.237 The
ONFL would certainly disrupt the lives of offenders who could
no longer travel internationally. Offenders might also face the
same challenges using other modes of international travel as
those on the terrorist watchlists.238 Just as the Latif court found
“long-term separation from spouses and children,” losses of “em-
230 Id.
231 Id. at 1143, 1149.
232 Id. at 1143.
233 Id. at 1149.
234 Id. at 1148.
235 Id. at 1149.
236 Id.
237 See id. at 1148.
238 See id. at 1143.
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ployment opportunities,” and the “inability to visit family” could
be caused by the No-Fly List,239 these same consequences could
result from being placed on the ONFL.
However, unlike in Latif, the ONFL would not constitute a
“significant deprivation”240 of those liberty interests because, un-
like the terrorist watchlists, the ONFL would not function as an
indefinite ban. Those placed on the list would have a definite
beginning and ending date ahead of time, and the process of
appealing administratively and judicially can be known. These
are measured consequences to an act that leaves its victims with
lasting consequences, and the offenders, unlike the victims, will
know exactly when the added burden will end.241
In Latif, the court also held that the plaintiffs were stigmatized
by being placed on the No-Fly list under the “stigma-plus doc-
trine.”242 Under this doctrine, plaintiffs “must show (1) public
disclosure of a stigmatizing statement by the government, the
accuracy of which is contested; plus (2) the denial of some more
tangible interest such as employment, or the alteration of a right
or status recognized by state law.”243 Where public disclosure was
limited to “a relatively small group of individuals” who witnessed
the denial of boarding or even an arrest, the court found this
was a “more limited” disclosure than those normally challenged
using this doctrine.244 The court held that the plaintiffs satisfied
the “plus” element because their legal status changed when they
legally could and then legally could not fly.245 Consequently, the
court held the plaintiffs’ interest in their reputations had been
infringed upon.246
While this was sufficient to satisfy the stigma-plus test for the
No-Fly List, this challenge would fail when applied to the ONFL.
The first prong of the test requires that the accuracy of the dis-
closure be contested.247 The Latif court found the accuracy of
the disclosure questionable due to low evidentiary standards and
239 Id. at 1149.
240 See id. at 1150.
241 See R.M. v. Am. Airlines, Inc. 338 F. Supp. 3d 1203, 1207–08 (D. Or. 2018)
(stating the minor victim was still suffering from the effects of the assault years
later).
242 Latif, 28 F. Supp. 3d at 1150.
243 Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Green v. Transp. Sec. Admin., 351 F.
Supp. 2d 1119, 1129 (W.D. Wash. 2005)).
244 Id. at 1151.
245 Id. at 1150–51.
246 Id. at 1151.
247 Id. at 1150.
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poor procedures regarding the watchlists.248 Neither of these
concerns will apply to the ONFL, as will be discussed under the
second Mathews test factor. Further, because admission to the
ONFL will only occur after a criminal conviction beyond a rea-
sonable doubt, the accuracy of the ONFL could be challenged
as a part of appealing a criminal conviction and not a separate
due process challenge.
When assessing the second factor in the Mathews test, courts
look at: (1) the risk of “erroneous deprivation” of the right to
travel and harm to reputation; and (2) the “probative value” of
additional or alternative procedural safeguards that could be
put in place.249 In reasoning the first part of this factor, the risk
of erroneous deprivation, courts consider both the “substantive
standard that the government uses to make its decision as well as
the procedural processes in place.”250
In Latif, the substantive standard was found to be very low.251
“[N]ominations to the TSDB are generally accepted based on a
‘reasonable suspicion’ that requires ‘articulable facts which,
taken together with rational inferences, reasonably warrant the
determination that an individual’ meets the substantive deroga-
tory criteria.”252 While this threshold is not merely a “hunch,” it
is less than probable cause and far less than “preponderance of
the evidence.”253
Beyond merely a low standard, the Latif court found several
procedural issues increased the risk of error.254 Government re-
ports indicated that the TSDB contained several mistakes and
that the TSC had failed to appropriately remediate these errors
when it needed to.255 Further, because the government did not
confirm whether the plaintiffs were on these lists or why they
were on these lists, the procedures created a “one-sided and in-
sufficient record at both the administrative and judicial level.”256
Plaintiffs could not even use this information to provide excul-
patory evidence should they find errors.257 Consequently, both
248 See id. at 1152–53.
249 See id. at 1151 (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)).
250 Id. (citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 761–64 (1982)).
251 See id. at 1151–52.
252 Id. at 1151.
253 Id. at 1151–52.
254 Id. at 1152–53.
255 Id. at 1152 (referring to an instance where a person suffered repercussions
over a period of nine years from briefly being added to the No-Fly List).
256 Id.
257 Id. at 1154.
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the low standard and the flawed system created substantial risks
of an individual having her liberty deprived erroneously.258 The
court also held that additional procedural safeguards after the
plaintiffs were denied boarding were needed to reduce the risk
of errors.259
Unlike in Latif, the ONFL would not suffer from similarly low
substantive standards or procedural issues. First, the substantive
standard would be the highest judicial standard. Offenders
would only be added to the ONFL after having been convicted
in a criminal proceeding involving sexual assault on an airplane.
Criminal convictions require a defendant to be found guilty
under the beyond a reasonable doubt standard.260 Unlike the
reasonable suspicion standard that is far below the preponder-
ance of the evidence standard,261 beyond a reasonable doubt is
the highest standard in use. Therefore, the ONFL would have
the lowest risk possible under the substantive standard factor.
Second, ONFL procedure exceeds the expectations and even
the additional procedural safeguards in Latif.262 Those on the
ONFL will know they are on the list and know the factors that
caused them to be added—being convicted for sexually assault-
ing someone on an airplane. Unlike in Latif, where the plaintiffs
only suspected they had been added to a watchlist after having
been denied boarding,263 those on the ONFL would have a hear-
ing prior to being added to the list and they would know whether
they had been added. Since both notice and explanation would
be given before being added to the ONFL, this exceeds even the
supplemental procedures recommended by the Latif court,
which were intended to give passengers explanation after having
been denied boarding.264 Additionally, since national security
secrecy would not be a factor, should passengers believe they
have been added to the ONFL list in error, the airline or a TSA
agent could easily confirm whether they were on the list.265 Fi-
nally, those on the list would still have administrative and judi-
258 Id. at 1152–53.
259 Id. at 1153 (discussing the value of plaintiffs’ requested additional safe-
guards to be added after a person was denied boarding: (1) post-deprivation no-
tice of placement on the list; (2) explanation of reasons for inclusion on the list;
and (3) post-deprivation hearings).
260 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
261 See Latif, 28 F. Supp. 3d at 1151–52.
262 See id. at 1153.
263 Id. at 1143.
264 See id. at 1153.
265 See id. at 1154.
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cial remedies to appeal their inclusion on the list, further
ensuring procedural safeguards and preventing errors. Given
the incredibly high substantive standard and procedural safe-
guards exceeding even the supplemental safeguards sought by
the Latif court, the second prong of the Mathews test comes out
substantially in favor of the ONFL.
When applying the last prong of the Mathews test, courts
weigh the public interest—“the administrative burden and
other societal costs that would be associated with requiring” ad-
ditional safeguards.266 In Mathews, the Supreme Court weighed
the government’s fiscal and administrative resources against the
addition of evidentiary cases when terminating a person’s disa-
bility benefits.267 In determining the balance, the Court stated
that the “ultimate balance involves a determination as to when,
under our constitutional system, judicial-type procedures must
be imposed upon administrative action to assure fairness.”268
The Court held that evidentiary hearings would be unnecessary
in light of the “good-faith judgments” of those appointed by
Congress to administer these programs.269
In Latif, as in similar cases involving the terrorist watchlists,
the government’s interest is preserving national security by
“combating terrorism and protecting classified information.”270
The Supreme Court has declared “that no governmental inter-
est is more compelling than the security of the Nation.”271 Con-
sequently, the Latif court found that this interest weighed in the
government’s favor for the last prong.272 Despite this enormous
interest, the court held that due process still required the gov-
ernment to give those denied boarding privileges three
things.273 The government must provide plaintiffs: (1) notice of
their status on the list; (2) sufficient explanations for their
“placement on that List” so that those denied could reasonably
submit evidence on their behalf; and (3) the opportunity to
have that evidence included in their files and considered at
every stage of review.274
266 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 347 (1976).
267 Id. at 347–48.
268 Id. at 348.
269 Id. at 348–49.
270 Latif, 28 F. Supp. 3d at 1154.
271 Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981).
272 Latif, 28 F. Supp. 3d at 1154.
273 Id. at 1162.
274 Id.
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In the case of the ONFL, the public interest is the public
safety of those who may suffer in-flight assaults. This is a signifi-
cant interest; however, even this substantial interest is likely not
as strong as the national security interest in preventing terrorist
acts or securing classified information, as in Latif.275 Even if an
opponent of the ONFL were to espouse the dubious claim that
this public safety interest is of the same weight as that of the
fiscal and administrative cost savings in Mathews, this interest
would still outweigh the benefits of any proposed supplemental
procedures.276 There, the Court’s deference to the good-faith
decisions of welfare agency administrators was enough for ex-
isting procedures to counterbalance the relatively low public in-
terest.277 As in Mathews, deference to the good-faith decisions of
judges and juries weigh in favor of imposing no other proce-
dures for the ONFL.
Even as a lesser interest, public safety is certainly still signifi-
cant, and whatever procedural options are weighed against it
will carry less weight. They carry less weight because, as previ-
ously mentioned, unlike the Latif court’s assessment of the sec-
ond prong of the Mathews test,278 the ONFL gives no reason to
fear erroneous deprivation of rights, and the ONFL has suffi-
cient procedural safeguards to meet the supplemental proce-
dures in that case.279 The ONFL’s safeguards meet all of the due
process requirements imposed by the Latif court, since offend-
ers will be given notice of list inclusion, a chance to see the pros-
ecution’s evidence and provide exculpatory evidence, and this
evidence will remain in the record for all appellate or adminis-
trative reviews.280 Furthermore, since the Latif court required
this after boarding was denied, the ONFL exceeds this standard
for all offenders by providing each element of procedure before
any denial of boarding.281
Ultimately, the weight of the public interest, proper defer-
ence to criminal judicial proceedings, a standard of guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt, and the substantial procedural safeguards
already in place demonstrate that the ONFL would certainly
275 See id. at 1154.
276 See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 347–48 (1976).
277 See id.
278 See Latif, 28 F. Supp. 3d at 1153–54.
279 See id. at 1153 (explaining the supplemental safeguards against which the
public interest will be weighed).
280 See id. at 1162.
281 See id.
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meet the standards for procedural due process for the No-Fly
List.
X. CONCLUSION
In-flight sexual assaults are either occurring more frequently,
or we are only now beginning to understand a sliver of the prob-
lem, thanks to the courage of women and children empowered
by the #MeToo movement. While the latest FAA Reauthoriza-
tion Act created a task force to study this problem in an attempt
to find the real numbers, it may be years before any action is
taken.282 The ONFL provides a first step to mitigate these dan-
gers now. It is time to address this issue.
Detractors of any restrictions on air travel emphasize the neg-
ative impacts these restrictions have on people’s ability to obtain
meaningful employment, attend family gatherings, see gradua-
tions, or participate in important religious functions.283 Oppo-
nents might suggest that such restrictions lead down a slippery
slope, but the slope is slippery for both sides. If nothing is done
to curtail the rise of in-flight sexual assaults, passengers will need
to weigh the increasing likelihood of an assault with the need to
travel. If air travel restrictions so negatively impact the lives of
those restricted, then the fear of becoming a victim of in-flight
sexual assault must just as negatively impact passengers who are
too afraid to fly.284 Neither better training for flight attendants
nor the use of federal marshals (who will only intervene after all
other possibilities have been exhausted) can provide assurance
for the women and children most likely to be affected.
Society is left with a choice. It may choose to impose a mea-
sured restriction against the freedom of those proven to have
committed an in-flight sexual assault, or it may choose to leave
offenders’ freedom to fly intact, thereby effectively limiting the
freedom to fly of those who have done nothing wrong. Any ac-
tion taken will restrict freedom. Even if the slope is slippery, the
consequences are clear.
The ONFL provides a preventative measure to an area of the
law that is riddled with unclear tort remedies and criminal pen-
282 See Press Release, Dep’t of Transp., U.S. Department of Transportation An-
nounces Aviation Consumer Protection Advisory Committee and National In-
Flight Sexual Misconduct Task Force (Nov. 15, 2018), https://www.transporta
tion.gov/briefing-room/dot7318 [https://perma.cc/UK83-EJ4J] (last visited
Aug. 14, 2019).
283 See Latif, 28 F. Supp. 3d at 1149.
284 See R.M. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 338 F. Supp. 3d 1203, 1207–08 (D. Or. 2018).
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alties of miniscule deterrence or prevention. The ONFL would
not violate due process, and it exceeds judicial requirements in
every category. This is a manageable solution built on an ex-
isting framework, and if in five years, stories of offenders com-
mitting their third sexual assault still make headlines, it will only
be because we failed to act now.
